

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
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| 1 | DCI | | | | |
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| 3 | EXDIR | | | | |
| 4 | D/ICS | | X ⁴ | | |
| 5 | DDI | X ² | | | |
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| 7 | DDO | | | | |
| 8 | DDS&T | | | | |
| 9 | Chm/NIC | X ³ | | | |
| 10 | GC | | | | |
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| 13 | D/OCA | | | | |
| 14 | D/PAO | | | | |
| 15 | D/PERS | | | | |
| 16 | D/Ex Staff | | | | |
| 17 | NIO/Warning | | X ⁵ | | |
| 18 | D/CPAS/DI | | 6 X (Attn: [redacted]) | | |
| 19 | EA/DCI | | 7 X | | |
| 20 | D/NIESO | | X (Added 880603) | | |
| 21 | (ER) | | X ¹ | | |
| 22 | | | | | |
| SUSPENSE | | | | | |

Remarks

To #17 & 18: Please coordinate Agency response for transmittal by ES.

Executive Secretary

27 May '88

Date

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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
May 25, 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: Draft of Proposed NSDD on Crisis Information

The draft of a proposed National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) on the National Security Information and Situation Management System (NSI&SMS) has been sent to the addressees at Tab A and is attached at Tab B for your review. This proposed directive is the product of interagency discussions within the Crisis Management Working Group (current membership at Tab C). The proposed NSDD would supersede NSDD 95.

We would appreciate your comments on the draft by June 6, 1988.



Paul Schott Stevens
Executive Secretary

Attachments

Tab A List of Addressees
Tab B Draft NSI&SMS NSDD
Tab C Current CMWG Membership

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90469**THE NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION AND SITUATION MANAGEMENT
SYSTEM (U)**

This directive updates policy and guidelines for sustaining and improving the nation's crisis management capability in support of the President, the National Security Council (NSC), and the interagency community. It builds on the technical progress achieved since signature of NSDD 95 in May 1983, and codifies the oversight, coordination, and procedural dimensions of a National Security Information and Situation Management System (NSI&SMS), consistent with the NSC structure and process approved in NSDD 266 and NSDD 276. This directive supersedes NSDD 95. (S)

Background

NSDD 95 established PROJECT MEDUSA, a framework for national-level crisis management and for making critical technical and procedural enhancements to associated department and agency operations centers. PROJECT MEDUSA created a Crisis Information and Management System (CIMS) to sustain effective and uninterrupted crisis management by providing a means of recording and disseminating adequate and timely intelligence, information, analyses, and policy options in form usable by top-level decision makers. This system was to include rigorous mechanisms for accessing, preserving and archiving historical data and associated decisions. (S)

Implementation of PROJECT MEDUSA, in conjunction with associated department and agency technical upgrades, significantly improved the nation's ability to respond to crises. PROJECT MEDUSA created a secure, multi-media telecommunications system for exchanging information, now referred to as the Secure Video Teleconferencing System (SVTS). The technical capabilities established under NSDD 95 present new opportunities for interagency coordination. These opportunities apply not only to crisis operations -- the urgent focus of PROJECT MEDUSA -- but also to the spectrum of government activities, from daily operations during peacetime through reconstitution after nuclear attack. (S)

The recent introduction of new technology and facilities for crisis management has created the technical capability to support a broader National Security Information and Situation Management System. The principles and longer-term objectives of the NSI&SMS are outlined below, together with necessary next steps following PROJECT MEDUSA. This directive codifies a

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process incorporating improvements made to date and will more fully address the requirements for effective interagency coordination in the future. (S)

Policy Principles

The NSI&SMS is an interagency network of people, facilities, equipment, information resources, plans, policies and procedures designed to provide for: (1) support to national-level decision makers in monitoring national security situations and in considering, implementing, or reporting on any U.S. response, and (2) a rapid and continuous flow of information regarding national security situations across a spectrum from peacetime activity through reconstitution following nuclear attack. (S)

The purpose of the NSI&SMS is to support the national leadership so that the policy and decision making process will not be impaired by a lack of information, procedures for coordination, or secure communications and data transmission capabilities. To the maximum possible extent, interagency coordination during periods of international tension or crisis, or domestic emergencies, shall be conducted by people concerned with the issues on a day-to-day basis using reliable equipment according to the same familiar, approved procedures with which we operate on a daily basis. (C)

The NSI&SMS shall be operationally integrated with Continuity of Government (COG) programs, the White House Emergency Plan, the Nuclear Command and Control System, and the National System for Emergency Coordination (NSEC). (TS)

The continuous, effective operation of the NSI&SMS is crucial and requires each agency's understanding of its individual role in the interagency process. The Executive departments and agencies involved in the NSI&SMS will budget for, procure, install, operate, and maintain compatible equipment and capabilities, and share appropriately the cost of system improvements that may be required. (S)

Implementation

Oversight of the NSI&SMS will be provided by the NSC through the Crisis Management Working Group (CMWG), chaired by the NSC's Deputy Executive Secretary for Situation Support. The CMWG will report to the Policy Review Group (PRG). (U)

The CMWG shall further develop the NSI&SMS and strengthen interagency capabilities and procedures for the collection,

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coordination, transmission, and dissemination of information in support of the President and the NSC. The CMWG shall meet regularly. In order to support the activities of the policy decision makers, appropriate CMWG members also may convene by means of SVTS or other secure communications at the outset of, or during, a situation to ensure effective information management and coordination among operations and intelligence centers. (S)

The CMWG shall be the principal interagency working group for coordination and consideration of policies and issues concerning the integration and interoperability of Continuity of Government (COG) programs. (TS)

The CMWG shall:

- Oversee formulation of policy relating to the NSI&SMS to ensure a system responsive to national needs; (S)
- Review and define interagency NSI&SMS operating procedures and responsibilities; (C)
- Ensure technical and operational capabilities are maintained and developed consistent with NSI&SMS objectives; (C)
- Ensure effective use of resources expended in establishing, operating, and modernizing the NSI&SMS; promoting interagency equipment compatibility; and recommending to the PRG priorities for those improvements that will affect interagency information flow; (U)
- Ensure integration of the NSI&SMS with COG, NSEC, and other coordinating activities related to national security; (TS)
- Ensure that the NSI&SMS supports the Director of Central Intelligence in monitoring and transmitting information on the world situation in the context of operational requirements for early warning; (TS)
- Ensure the capability to control and coordinate the flow of critical information from the White House and other Washington-area operations centers to all COG elements, and to direct changes in their operational posture; (TS)

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- Ensure that interoperable equipment and compatible procedures are established among relevant departments and agencies, and COG elements; and (TS)
- Provide for regular exercising and testing of the NSI&SMS. (C)

CMWG membership shall include representatives from Executive departments and agencies with responsibility relating to the national response to international incidents or domestic emergencies potentially affecting the national security of the United States. The CMWG chair shall establish a Steering Group to develop and monitor its agenda, and may establish other subgroups as required. To the extent possible, the CMWG shall use already existing interagency committees to facilitate coordination and resolution of issues. (S)

Situation management at the national level requires close coordination and cooperation among Executive departments and agencies. As the supporting system, the NSI&SMS can only remain responsive to national situation management needs if the community actively participates and interacts in the evolution of this critical situation management system. Accordingly, each participating Executive department and agency shall:

- Designate a member to serve on the CMWG;
- Participate in exercises to improve and maintain the proficiency of situation management personnel and evaluate the responsiveness of the NSI&SMS; and
- Budget for, procure, manage, operate, and maintain equipment in its facilities in a manner consistent with NSI&SMS objectives and procedures. (C)

The Department of Defense, because of its close and continuing involvement with PROJECT MEDUSA and the NSI&SMS, shall continue to act as the Executive Agent for the NSI&SMS. The Department of Defense shall:

- Provide NSI&SMS architecture and systems engineering support in response to requirements identified and approved through the CMWG;
- Ensure an NSI&SMS Master Plan is developed to maintain an affordable and modern NSI&SMS focused on fully exploiting the capabilities of current equipment, and ensuring compatibility and interoperability among all NSI&SMS nodes and COG systems;

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- Continue to provide the SVTS Program Manager and Configuration Manager assistance to complete the installation and testing of the SVTS; assist in developing SVTS user procedures for CMWG review; and examine and recommend cost-effective modifications to the current SVTS in response to requirements identified by the CMWG; and
- Ensure that NSI&SMS activities and security procedures are consistent with NSI&SMS security requirements. (S)

The Department of Defense shall continue to provide resources and technical support to NSI&SMS in the White House complex. (S)

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